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« Cultures nationales et identité communautaire : un défi pour l'Union européenne »

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Résumés

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✓ *Historical discourse, enlargement and European identity in the European Parliament*

The ultimate aim of this paper is to show whether it is possible to see the emergence of a coherent historical narrative of Europe aimed at the construction of a collective European identity. It focuses on the European Parliament which is, among all European institutions, the one that by its very nature as a deliberative and public body provides an ideal window into the use and promotion of concepts of European identity within the European institutional landscape. It is a showcase of a varied spectrum of political and national conceptions of Europe. Whilst there have been studies of policies adopted by the Commission to promote a European identity, looking at the EP highlights a different process of identity formation through rhetoric and discourse.

The analysis will look at the intersection between two factors in the construction of European identity : the idea of the founding fathers, and the role played by European institutions in the formation of a common European identity. A fundamental assumption of this analysis is that, alongside the use of symbols such as a European flag and the promotion of policies such as European study programmes and exchanges, European identity can also be furthered by the daily political rhetoric used by prominent individuals and institutions in the European public sphere. This paper will focus on the latter, with a particular emphasis on the use of historical references specific to the shared experience of European integration.

In particular, the analysis will focus on the use of historical references to the founding fathers and the process of European integration since the 1950s, to establish whether it is possible to identify a process of construction of a common historical memory within the discourse of this institution. Taking the issue of enlargement as a catalyst for discussions of the idea of Europe and European identity among Europe's elected representatives, this paper will analyse how the EP discussed the issue of enlargement to Eastern Europe between 1993, after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria, and 2004, when ten new Central, Eastern and Southern European states joined the EU.

It will encompass an exploration of plenary debates on enlargement capturing the set of references used and looking at how widespread and coherent their use is across the national and political spectrums within the EP, putting these in relation to national and party political preferences within Parliament. This will be compared with speeches on enlargement by EP Presidents (and some individual MEPs ?) outside Parliament, to explore whether this narrative is projected outside the boundaries of the institution to promote a collective European memory and common identity.

Muriel Bourdon

Muriel Bourdon est actuellement doctorante en sciences humaines à l'université Pierre Mendès France de Grenoble. Elle effectue une thèse sous la direction de Bernard Bruneteau sur « Naissance et développement de la construction européenne, l'Université Pierre Mendès France et ses réseaux, des années 1970 à nos jours ». Ce travail s'inscrit dans la continuité du mémoire de DEA dirigé par Pierre Guillen.

✓Naissance et développement d'une identité communautaire à travers l'exemple de l'université des sciences sociales de Grenoble (des années 1960 à nos jours).

Dans la formation d'une identité communautaire, l'université est un acteur privilégié et ce, depuis le Moyen-Âge : elle transmet un corpus de valeurs universelles (*universitas*) transmises par la *peregrinatio academica*. La Commission européenne, afin de construire un sentiment d'adhésion au processus d'unité européenne, a mis en place des actions envers les chercheurs tout d'abord, puis envers les étudiants. Dans la stratégie de Lisbonne¹ la construction d'un espace européen d'enseignement supérieur est devenue une finalité. Quelle est la réalité et la nature de cette identité communautaire depuis les années soixante ? L'exemple de l'Université des Sciences Sociales de Grenoble (UPMF) permet de mesurer les effets de cette politique volontariste.

Les programmes d'actions de la Commission ont commencé timidement à l'égard des universités, l'éducation ne faisant pas partie des premiers Traités européens. En 1963, à l'initiative de Jean Moreau, la division d'information (DGX) de la Commission encourage la création de Centres de Documentation Européenne qui se transforment en France, en centres de recherche. À Grenoble, en 1968, l'économiste Louis Reboud, ancien directeur de la Commission, crée le CUREI. La recherche pluridisciplinaire et l'enseignement au sein du DEA à partir de 1975 transmettent des valeurs relayées par le réseau des « anciens » : des enseignants mais également des juristes et économistes européens. Parmi eux figurent des Grecs soucieux de préparer l'adhésion de leur pays en 1981.

En 1998, l'Action Jean Monnet, mise en place par Jacqueline Lastenouse de la DGX, donne une représentation concrète de ces valeurs partagées. Les Chaires Jean Monnet récompensent les chercheurs en « intégration européenne ». Ils sont invités à animer des pôles d'excellence, véritables phares de cette identité communautaire. À Grenoble, les programmes Tempus TACIS conduits par Catherine Schneider, permettent en Russie la transmission des valeurs européennes et la transition démocratique d'universitaires.

S'écarter de cette vision élitiste, chère à Jean Monnet, le programme Erasmus constitue un autre emblème de cette identité communautaire. Howell Cery Jones de la DGXII² aime à souligner l'approche « bottom up » de ses premiers programmes interuniversitaires d'échanges, les PIC³, initiés en 1976. Bénéficiant d'un financement communautaire, cette mobilité européenne est institutionnalisée en 1987 par Alan Smith avec le programme Erasmus. Depuis 20 ans, les liens noués entre les universités suivent et dépassent les élargissements successifs de l'Europe dessinant un véritable espace européen de l'enseignement supérieur. À Grenoble, plus de 300 accords ont été signés.

Comment mesurer l'impact de ces programmes sur l'identité communautaire des universitaires ? À Grenoble, le rayonnement tiers-mondiste de la faculté d'économie dans la voie tracée par le professeur De Bernis⁴ a été totalement occulté par la construction européenne. Les cursus se sont européa-

¹Définie lors du Conseil européen de Lisbonne le 24 mars 2000.

²Direction générale chargée sur secteur de la recherche, de la science et de l'éducation.

³Programmes interuniversitaires Communs.

⁴Économiste grenoblois d'inspiration marxiste, défendant un développement autocentré. Conseiller économique auprès du gouvernement algérien après l'indépendance.

nisés et les économistes des pays socialistes mettent en œuvre d'immenses programmes européens PHARE⁵ ou TACIS⁶ dans l'ancien bloc communiste, à l'image du projet Prometee⁷ d'Ivan Samson. En formant des chercheurs russes à la pensée économique européenne. L'identité communautaire dépasse les frontières de l'Union pour tendre vers un paneuropéanisme, idée chère à Coudenhove Kalergi, qui se distinguerait d'un panaméricanisme.

Robin de Bruin

Robin de Bruin (1971) is preparing a PhD thesis at VU University Amsterdam on the enthusiasm in Dutch politics for European integration in the 1950's and 1960's. He has published several articles on this subject as well as on the subject of the Dutch civil service during (and shortly after) the German occupation. From 2002 onwards, he was a lecturer in political and social history at VU University Amsterdam and at Utrecht University (from 2006). In the current academic year he teaches courses on European integration history at the University of Amsterdam.

✓The 'elastic' European ideal. Images in Dutch politics of a future federal Europe, 1948-1958

After the congress in The Hague for a United Europe in May 1948 until August of 1954, when the French parliament prevented the realization of the European Defense Community and the European Political Community that was connected with it, many Dutch politicians seemed to expect the quick realization of a political federation (or even a political union) in Europe. Judging from the enthusiasm of many politicians, this federation was not only considered inevitable, but desirable as well. Hardly any politician openly opposed the integration of Europe. Prime minister Willem Drees kept secret his fears that the governmental income policy (of low wages for the cause of the postwar economic reconstruction) would be endangered as a consequence of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Drees' Labour Party criticized the British Labour Party for its aloofness with regard to the integration of Europe. Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the German SPD, was strongly criticized for his objections regarding the European unification and for the postwar "nationalism" of the German social democrats.

The European ideal was justified by a great variety of causes. Jérôme Heldring, a famous Dutch journalist, strikingly spoke about the 'elastic' European ideal. In the Netherlands a United Europe was pursued by means of a strange brew of socio-economic, moral and pragmatic arguments, and in all political parties different arguments were emphasized. The Dutch political parties all presented 'Europe' as a means for achieving their respective aims.

My paper compares the reasoning in support of European integration by politicians from the Dutch Labour Party on the one hand and the Dutch Calvinist Antirevolutionaire Partij on the other, as well as the (to some extent ideologically formed) images of the future Unified Europe these politicians imagined. In particular, my paper will deal with notions on the anti-totalitarian character of a future 'Christian Europe' in the debate about the integration of Europe within the Antirevolutionaire Partij, and with the conviction of Dutch social democrats that the political compromises between Dutch Catholic and Labour politics served as an example for a future, 'real democratic Europe'.

Oriane Calligaro

Oriane Calligaro is PhD student at the European University Institute (Florence). She holds a Master's Degree in Political and Social Sciences from the Free University in Berlin and in History and Political Theory

⁵Programme d'aide communautaire aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale.

⁶TACIS vise à favoriser la transition vers une économie de marché et renforcer la démocratie et l'État de droit dans les États partenaires d'Europe orientale et d'Asie centrale.

⁷Prometee I et II sont des programmes TACIS. Le premier (1993-96) visait à former les élites à la pensée européenne, le deuxième, sur le même modèle, concernait des chercheurs de Kaliningrad. (1997-2000).

from Sciences Po (Paris). She worked as a trainee for the European Commission. Her research project investigates the EU's 'identity policies' promoting a knowledge of Europe and a sense of identification to the European project among the citizens.

✓The EU actions in the field of heritage, 1974-2007. A contribution to the discussion on the role of culture in the European integration process

The paper falls into a larger reflection on the role of culture in the European integration process, especially in the perspective of the emergence of a European identity. Its purpose is to study the introduction and the evolution of a EU cultural action over a long period of time. The specific field of action investigated, from the early 1970s until today, is the European cultural heritage. The European cultural heritage, as object of reflections and actions on the part of the European institutions, proves to be a crucial element to understand the conception of a European cultural policy. The concept of European cultural heritage first appeared on the EU level in 1973 during a period of crisis of legitimacy for the European institutions. In a resolution, the European Parliament (EP), urged the Community to start a significant action in favor of the protection and enhancement of the European heritage. The central element of its argumentation was the urgent need to give a 'human' face to the European Community and to foster a greater identification of the citizens with the European project. The European heritage was presented as a means to epitomize, to make sensible and visible the European identity. With this resolution, the European heritage was imposed as an essential instrument for the emergence of a European identity, what it will remain in the following decades of the European integration process.

A first part of this study will show how the concept of European heritage has been introduced by the EP as a crucial component of the European identity – an identity that European institutions needed to promote in order to relaunch the process of integration in a context of legitimacy crisis. This will allow us to emphasize the leading role played by the EP in this issue in front of the reluctance of the European Commission to engage concrete actions in the cultural field. The description of the very progressive involvement of the Commission in the field of heritage, mainly in response to the demands formulated by the EP or on the intergovernmental level, shall highlight the incremental rather than intentional dimension of the EU action in the realm of 'identity politics'.

In a second part of this paper, a close look at the reflections on heritage emanating from the different European institutions will reveal the absence of a centralized and monolithic conception of the European heritage, and even possible divergences. The concept of heritage, first introduced with the clear intention of highlighting the existence of a European identity, has also progressively become a way to express on the European scene local and regional identities and to defend their interests, which runs counter to the idea of a top-down and elitist conception of heritage. By presenting itself as the defender of the regional cultural heritages, the EU can also develop a model of multilayered identity which can encompass local, national and European dimensions. Finally, this study will highlight an important evolution in the recent years which reveals the great flexibility of the concept of European heritage. The European heritage has been first conceived as a positive reference capable of producing identification. A process initiated in the early 1990s by the EP and accelerated after the 2004 enlargement leads to the progressive inclusion of dark episodes of the European past in the definition of European heritage, and thus of European identity. The taking into consideration of Europe's violent, racist, dictatorial past may be the sign of a reassessment of the rather irenic representation of European identity on the EU level.

Fabio Calugi

Fabio Calugi is graduated in Political Sciences at University of Pisa, with a final thesis on the Communist press during the Trieste crisis. Now He is a PhD candidate at IMT – Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies : his research field is Political History and Political Communication.

✓ *Italian Left and Europe : the reasons of a cultural delay*

It's well-known that the "European Idea" was not a post-war invention, but it had important roots in the tormented history of the Continent (since France Revolution, to more recent interwar period). However, certainly, Europeanism sprang up again, with greater strength and greater determination, during World War II, among the pains of political prisoners in concentration camps and the daily efforts of partisan groups engaged in different zones of Europe.

Despite this "resistancial incubation", the first steps of new Europeanist project met with the distrust and the opposition of one of the most relevant leading characters of Anti-Nazi Liberation Front : the Communist movement.

In the dawning of modern Europeanism, the western Communist Parties didn't recognize – or didn't want to – a genuinely international spirit, neither a factor of peaceful development for the future of Continent. Because ideological suggestions and strategic motivations, European Communism perceived those still vague integrationist projects as abstruse theoretical constructions that were proposing only new divisions and new contrasts : also for Europe, the sole real and effective international scheme was the socialist one !

Also in Italy, the Communist Party strongly bared the first formulations of "European Idea", fighting every attempt at promotion of integration processes, since the beginning and with the greatest determination. As a matter of fact, in the second half of Forties, from PCI point of view an unitary prospect for western Europe was very unbecoming : in a first phase, during post-war transition period (1945-1947), it was representing a threat for the stability of "Great Anti-Nazi Alliance", the international scenario that was essential presupposition for Italian Communists internal tactic ; later on, just in Cold War climate (after 1947), it was seen as an unacceptable instrument of USA politics for control of the Old Continent.

Therefore Palmiro Togliatti's PCI ran a very hard anti-Europeanist campaign, mobilizing the official party-led instruments of communication, the voices of the large Communist-oriented part of Italian intelligentsia and the pressure groups and the collateral organizations outside the party system, but linked to great "Red Party". The Communist propaganda attacked the first Europeanist proposals, criticizing their international significance (anti-Soviet finalities, instrumental nature of integration projects in favour of western imperialistic interests, etc) and contesting the value of entire theoretical plant, also having recourse to elements of nationalist rhetoric (Europeanism as threat for national independence and freedom).

In this strong anti-Europeanist effort of the party that succeeded in creating an own hegemony in post-war Italian Left, we can observe the main reasons of the original incomprehension that, at first, characterized the relationship between Italian Leftist parties and Europeanist process : a cultural delay that, notwithstanding the generous pro-Europeanist action of important liberal-socialist exponent (in primis, the Euro-federalist Artiero Spinelli), was filled only after a long period of distrust and misunderstandings.

Frédéric Clavert

Diplômé de l'IEP de Strasbourg, j'ai soutenu une thèse sur Hjalmar Schacht, président de la Reichsbank (1924-1930 ; 1933-1939) et ministre de l'Économie (1934-1937) allemand, sous direction de Sylvain Schirmann en décembre 2006. J'effectue actuellement des recherches sur les relations entre les gouverneurs des banques centrales et la construction européenne au cours du XX^e siècle. Travaillant au Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (Luxembourg – <http://www.ena.lu/>), je m'intéresse également aux relations entre le Web et l'histoire contemporaine.

✓ Une identité monétaire européenne ? – De la rencontre Schacht-Norman (1924) à la crise des subprimes (2008)

La notion d'« identité monétaire européenne » a été avancée par la France à la fin des années 1960⁸ et reprise par la Commission en 1973⁹. Alors que le Système monétaire international issu de Bretton Woods montre des signes de dysfonctionnement, les Européens intensifient alors leur réflexion sur l'organisation monétaire de l'Europe. Néanmoins, cette réflexion ne date pas des années 1960.

À l'occasion du colloque du bicentenaire de la Banque de France, Olivier Feiertag et Michel Margairaz ont mis en relation les instituts d'émission avec le concept de l'identité monétaire européenne, la définissant comme un « ensemble de pratiques, de valeurs et de représentations communes attaché à la monnaie et construit par étapes de la fin du XVIII^e à la fin du XX^e siècle [...] »¹⁰

Nous reprendrons cette définition, en la limitant au XX^e siècle. De la rencontre entre Hjalmar Schacht, président de la Reichsbank avec Montagu Norman, gouverneur de la Banque d'Angleterre le 1er janvier 1924, qui montre une volonté de coopération entre les banques centrales, à la politique de la Banque centrale européenne (bce) pour lutter contre les conséquences de la crise des subprimes, cette contribution se propose d'analyser le contenu de cette notion d'identité monétaire européenne et son évolution au cours du XX^e siècle d'une part et de montrer en quoi elle a contribué à la définition en cours d'une identité européenne plus générale d'autre part.

Cette double problématique permettra d'aborder de nombreux sujets. La question d'un espace public européen sera posée, dans la mesure où les débats portant sur la politique des banques centrales ont une portée européenne. Ces débats mènent en premier lieu à une convergence progressive des statuts et des pratiques des banques centrales européennes puis à la mise en place d'une monnaie commune et d'un système européen de banques centrales avec à sa tête une Banque centrale européenne. Ils montrent aussi qu'il existe des valeurs monétaires communes. La coopération entre banques centrales depuis les années 1920, son intensification, puis la création de la bce participent à une articulation entre les traditions monétaires nationales et ces valeurs européennes. Cette articulation pose également la question du sentiment d'adhésion au processus d'intégration que peut provoquer une monnaie et une politique monétaires communes. Enfin, les coopérations régulières entre la bce et les banques centrales extérieures à la zone euro montrent qu'il faudra préciser dans quelle mesure cette « identité monétaire européenne » se définit par rapport à l'extérieur et, plus particulièrement, par rapport à la Réserve fédérale des États-Unis.

Cette contribution prendra également en compte les difficultés liées à cette notion d'« identité monétaire européenne ». En effet, les nombreux et vifs débats sur la politique monétaire de la bce montrent que l'« identité monétaire européenne » n'est pas partagée par l'ensemble des Européens : on parlera ainsi plutôt de « processus » de convergence vers une « identité monétaire européenne », processus qui peut être remis en cause.

Les archives utilisées proviendront des fonds de banques centrales européennes, des archives historiques de l'Union européenne (Florence) et, dans la mesure du possible, de la Banque des règlements internationaux, à Bâle.

Isabel Maria Freitas Valente

Member of Team Europe – Portugal, since 2007. Encharged of development of contents, training, animation, competitions for Professors and other school staff training in the Jacques Delors European Information Centre of Lisbon, since 2005. PhD student in Altos Estudos Contemporâneos (História Contemporânea e Estudos Internacionais Comparativos), Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal. Master in

⁸Bossuat, G. (1998) : « Questions sur l'identité monétaire européenne à travers les positions de Jean Monnet, Robert Triffin et Pierre Mendès France ». In : Bussière, E. et Dumoulin, M., *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle* (Arras : Artois Presses Université), 105-113.

⁹Magnusson, L. et Stråth, B. (2001) : *From the Werner plan to the EMU : in search of a political economy for Europe*. Bruxelles ; New York. P.I.E.-Peter Lang. 490 p., Introduction, p. 34.

¹⁰Feiertag, O. et Margairaz, M. (2003) : *Politiques et pratiques des banques d'émission en Europe (XVII^e-XX^e siècle) : le bicentenaire de la Banque de France dans la perspective de l'identité monétaire européenne*. Paris. A. Michel. 832 p., p. 19.

Estudos sobre a Europa. Europa–As Visões do 'Outro'speciality of European Studies, by Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra, in 2004.

✓ *Calvet Magalhães's contribution to the building process of an European identity in Portugal*

The Ambassador José Thomaz Calvet de Magalhães (1915-2004) is one of the father's of Portugal's European's integration because of the concrete acts that he made in favour of Portugal's European's integration. He is with Ambassador Teixeira Guerra at the origin of Portugal's integration in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and on the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) after named Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE), decisive sequel of constructional complex process of the understanding and communal cooperation between Portugal and the international economical organization. In 1960 he is the Portuguese Ambassador in European Communities where he reached enormous prestige that has been determinant to the negotiations of Portugal for associate membership in 1962, for the 1972 Common Market Trade agreement and to the adhesion process in 1986.

Calvet de Magalhães did not every thing but he inspired Portuguese elites, his colleagues to serve his goal – Portugal's integration. He conceived the European unity as the beginning of a pacified international relations process, to witch Portugal should participate and contribute.

Since the being he did not see any other solutions that to insert Portugal in the Atlantic setting and in Europe. His choice of a pro North Atlantic Treaty Organization (OTAN), and a pro Europe Portugal caused several confrontations with those that defended an African option to Portugal and also with Portuguese Government.

The active policy of the Portuguese government only regarding European integration was, in political terms, an attempt to maintain its external economic relations at the intergovernmental, not supranational level. By the late 1950s the Portuguese government faced increased domestic pressure, which should be encountered with a successful European policy.

This essay aims at analysing the Magalhães's intellectual thoughts and action in profit of European pacifism and Portugal's integration.

As an intellectual, as a diplomat, as a political or as a citizen he hoisted the radical pacifism flag legate of Humanism and were a promoter and dynamizing agent of the ideas of a federal Europe.

Iris Glockner

Since March 2007, Iris Glockner is working as a Lecturer at the Chair of Political Science and Contemporary History at the University of Mannheim. Before, she studied at the Universities of Heidelberg and Leiden. In October 2006 she was awarded an M.A. degree from the University of Heidelberg in Political Science, Psychology and Public Law. The topic of her M.A. thesis was 'United in diversity? Political Science and psychological approaches to exploring a common European identity'.

✓ *Cultural vs. multiple identities? Applying constructivist and essentialist approaches about political and cultural identities to the question of multiple identification in the European Union*

Ever since the beginning of the European integration process its impact on national identities has been discussed controversially.

The object of this paper is to draw on theoretical approaches regarding the nature of national as well as of a common European identity in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between national and European identities. In principle, two opposing views can be distinguished : national and European identity could be either compatible or exclusive. Whereas proponents of the former argue that people can display national and European identities without any psychological difficulties, advocates of the latter view point out that either national identities inhibit the evolution of a European identity or the emergence of a European identity will be accompanied by the waning of national identities.

In general, literature dealing with the nature of identity can be assigned to either cultural or political identity approaches. A broad definition of cultural identity denotes a we-feeling among citizens

that can be based on shared traditions, practices, orientations, symbols, tales, art as well as a common language and therefore includes the concept of historical identity. Essentialist approaches of identity formation focus primarily on cultural background variables and traditionally take an "exclusive stance" in that they consider the relationship between national and European identity a zero sum game. Political identity, however, is independent of a shared culture or common descent and is based instead on shared political values. It can refer to actors, as in the case of institutional identity, as well as to codified political values at the heart of the concept of constitutional patriotism. Underlining its constructed rather than primordial nature, political identity is a topic of central interest to contemporary constructivist research. Constructivist reasoning emphasizes the ability of political identities to render national and European identity compatible. The assumption that political identities in general are beneficial to multiple identities in the EU can be called into question, though.

I argue that to gain a better understanding of the relationship between national and European identity, it might be necessary to subdivide the concept of political identity. Depending on whether people identify with a federal or a unitary national polity, their ability to identify with the EU might vary : a "federal national political identity" can be expected to be more compatible with a European identity, because people are more used to identify with different levels of governance already at a national level. Accordingly, it may be expected that Germans, as opposed to French citizens, have fewer problems to reconcile their national identity with a European one.

Though there is a lot of theoretical work on the nature of national and European identities, little attention has been devoted to an empirical examination of what exactly people think about when claiming to identify with their nation or the European Union. Beyond the theoretical puzzle, in-depth knowledge of the political and cultural nature of identities is required to fully explore the potential of the concept of identity as a variable.

Julien Gueslin

Julien Gueslin est agrégé et docteur en histoire, spécialiste de l'histoire des Etats baltes et des petits Etats en Europe au XX^e siècle. Conservateur à la Bibliothèque nationale de France, il a travaillé sur la redéfinition de la politique de la BNF et des bibliothèques du supérieur vis-à-vis des publications communautaires et leur valorisation et sur l'évolution de la politique d'information de la CEE, notamment vis-à-vis des milieux universitaires, depuis les années 60.

✓A la recherche des opinions publiques : les débuts de la politique d'information des Communautés européennes (1958-1972)

Dès les origines de la construction européenne, la création d'un service commun des communautés et la définition des actions à mener en terme d'information ont suscité des rivalités au sein des exécutifs communautaires, entre les institutions et entre les États : faut-il sortir d'une information sur les actions menés dans le cadre strict des traités ou diffuser une « information en profondeur », visant à créer les conditions d'existence d'une opinion publique européenne et donc à terme d'une communauté politique ? Quels sont les relais d'information à privilégier afin d'assurer une publicité maximale à l'idée européenne ? La communication mettra en valeur la création laborieuse du service commun d'information et de presse et prendre en priorité l'exemple des milieux universitaires comme cible privilégiée de l'action communautaire.

Daniel Habit

M.A., Scientific assistant, Institut für Volkskunde/Europäische Ethnologie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Topic : *European Capitals of Culture – Space, Modernity and Memory*

✓Creating Europe ? Urban approaches towards a difficult concept

Among the diverse programs, strategies and approaches in the Union's cultural policy, the concept of the "European Capital of Culture" marks an outstanding example of the interference between the Union itself, the aligning city (or even region) and its civil society and the consuming visitors. On the initiative of the then Greek Minister of Culture Melina Mercouri, the idea of creating a European City of Culture was brought up in 1983 and in 1985 Athens became the first in a row of 38 cities (till 2008). Invented as Cultural City of Europe, the title was awarded for one year to a European city until 2001, when a new EU decision expanded the program to two cities. In short, the EU claims to "foster cooperation between cultural operators, artists and cities from the relevant Member States and other Member States in any cultural sector ; highlight the richness of cultural diversity in Europe ; bring the common aspects of European cultures to the fore" (CEC 2006 : 3). The mapping of the Capitals and the spatial development of the concept unearth the changes of the Union's structural and cultural policy. Since the beginning in the 1980s with renowned representatives of a European art and cultural history such as Florence (1986), Berlin (1988), Paris (1989) or Madrid (1992), the focus shifted from the metropolises to the periphery and "second" or even "third" cities like Thessaloniki (1997), Bergen (2000), Graz (2003) or Patras (2006) appeared on the European cultural map.

After an analysis of the EU's cultural policy as it can be found in its various publications, this paper will focus on the European Capital of Cultures 2006/2007, Patras, Sibiu and Luxemburg and their handling of the EU concept within their urban local context. Due to several factors, the three cities can be seen as a perfect example for what Johler called a "European Place" (Johler 2002). Their history can be considered as a truly European history concerning questions of migration, interethnic coexistence, changing national belongings and ideological systems that can be found in the habitus of the city. This perspective concentrates on spaces and places where the "New Europe" is constructing itself and can be experienced in its symbolism and materialisation. In a European context, cities play a double role, as they are agents as well as goals of Europeanization. In their context, the simultaneity of globalization and localization becomes visible and merge in the concept of "glocalization", combining deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Furthermore, the focus is on the use (and misuse) of European symbols, terms and images as they are presented in the cities and their acceptance both among the cities' citizens and visitors.

Houda Hamouda

En troisième année de doctorat d'histoire contemporaine sous la direction de Robert Frank, à l'Université Paris 1. Je suis également enseignante dans le secondaire. Je prépare une thèse qui s'inscrit dans le sens de la compréhension de l'histoire politique des relations passées et avenir entre l'Union Européenne et l'espace méditerranéen, plus particulièrement la région du Maghreb de 1957 aux années 1970.

✓La présence de l'identité européenne sur le pourtour méditerranéen sous l'angle de la politique étrangère de la CEE de 1957 aux années 1970

Ma communication s'attachera à étudier la politique étrangère de l'UE – envers les pays méditerranéens, plus particulièrement le Maghreb – comme moyen d'affirmation de son identité européenne par ses orientations et ses actions diplomatiques. En effet, d'après Michel Girard, « la rencontre des autres dans les rapports internationaux est toujours une expérience décisive dans la définition de soi, par l'autre comme par soi ». Voilà pourquoi mon angle d'étude se focalisera sur la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne qui constitue un des domaines d'élection pour l'observation des phénomènes identitaires en Europe.

La politique étrangère et la sécurité étant deux des attributs régaliens fondamentaux de la souveraineté des États. Il y a eu donc une réticence historique au près des états Européens bien compréhensible, aggravée par l'échec de la CED (Communauté Européenne de Défense) en 1954, à envisager un transfert de compétences, même partiel, en ce domaine et qui fut un élément totalement absent du Traité de Rome. Cependant, deux mouvements historiques de fond ont contribué au rapprochement des politiques étrangères européennes : notamment par la volonté d'instituer une Europe politique, c'est en cela que le Traité de Rome peut être perçu comme un contournement de l'obstacle politique par l'intégration économique, après l'échec, en 1954, de la Communauté européenne de défense. Les Six n'ont renoué avec le dessein de l'Union politique qu'au Sommet de La Haye, en décembre 1969. En réponse à une requête des Chefs d'État et de gouvernement, que les Ministres des Affaires étrangères ont proposé en juin 1970 un développement « de la coopération dans le domaine de la politique étrangère ». Et c'est ainsi que naît la Coopération politique européenne (CPE), qui a fonctionné durant plus de vingt ans, de manière pragmatique mais substantielle, en dehors du cadre communautaire.

Par ailleurs, on doit au mouvement d'intégration européenne une meilleure compréhension mutuelle et cela a naturellement accru les intérêts communs : intérêts économiques et commerciaux, mais également des valeurs partagées fondatrices de l'Europe démocratique. Elle a aussi conduit à imaginer un rapprochement des politiques étrangères en raison de l'accroissement de l'action extérieure de la CEE (politique commerciale commune, accords internationaux et accords d'association, politique d'aide au développement), d'autant que les critiques n'ont cessé de se développer, dans le même temps, à l'encontre du « géant économique mais nain politique » européen. L'interférence croissante entre les questions économiques et commerciales et la politique internationale, illustrée notamment par le recours accru à des mesures de sanctions, a également joué en ce sens. Enfin, les élargissements successifs de l'Union européenne, au Royaume-Uni, à l'Espagne et au Portugal, ont naturellement élargi le spectre de ses relations extérieures au Commonwealth, à l'Amérique latine et aux autres pays lusophones et hispanophones.

Grâce à ses différentes politiques externes, l'UE entretient des relations avec de nombreux partenaires à travers le monde, par l'intermédiaire de divers instruments, notamment des accords de coopération et des programmes financiers. L'action extérieure regroupe l'ensemble des politiques de l'UE qui sont dirigées vers le reste du monde ou qui traitent de sujets de dimension internationale.

Du fait de la proximité géographique et de l'intensité des échanges entre l'Europe et les pays du Maghreb, outre l'importante coopération entre ces deux entités, j'ai décidé d'étudier l'identité politique européenne par le prisme de la politique étrangère de l'UE au Maghreb.

Au cours de ma communication, je tenterai de répondre à plusieurs questions, que je vous expose ci-après : Que peut donc signifier aujourd'hui une Europe politique ? Quel contenu, quel sens, quel projet ? Y-a-t-il une visibilité de l'identité européenne à l'extérieur de son territoire et à partir de quelle moment ? Enfin peut-on, en d'autres termes, envisager l'émergence, d'une identité communautaire au-delà des frontières européennes ?

Krzysztof Iszkowski

Krzysztof Iszkowski, born 1978. Graduated in sociology (University of Warsaw) and international relations (Warsaw School of Economics), studied also at Bard College (USA), Oxford and Liverpool. In 2008 defended doctoral thesis on the divergent logics of European integration and their impact on present political choices (Institute of Sociology and Philosophy, Polish Academy of Sciences). Worked as lecturer at the Warsaw School of Social Psychology and as journalist at Europa, a literary weekly supplement to Dziennik, second largest Polish daily. Currently an official of the European Commission, lives in Brussels.

✓The European identity : symbols without essence

The fact that the nature of the common European identity still needs to be discussed, proves that the previous debates on that issue did not end with a commonly accepted agreement. In the proposed paper I will argue that the main reason for such inconclusiveness is the fact that European identity has been perceived and analysed mostly in cultural categories. Meanwhile, the identity that could

strengthen and stimulate the political project of continent's unification needs itself to be of a political nature.

The above argument will be presented in three steps. I will start with explaining the reasons why the previous debates did focus on cultural factors. The common cultural heritage seemed to be the most convincing proof of European unity which the advocates of European integration could evoke in support of their project. The stress on culture was additionally increased by the fact that the nationalistic paradigm predominant in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries created a belief that both state and culture are obvious emanations of nationhood. In those circumstances, the cultural unity of Europe was perceived as a sign that the continent might and eventually should become politically unified, following the examples of the German and Italian cultural areas which were converted into nation states in the second half of the 19th century.

Having adopted this ethno-cultural approach, the proponents of European unity went beyond searching for evidence that the continent shares a common culture. Assuming that common identity is a prerequisite for a common polity, they reverted to the identity-building mechanisms developed in the era of the creation of nation states, and attempted to create the European identity through state-like symbols such as flag, anthem and passport. Unsurprisingly, those attempts were soon criticised as rough manipulation and, instead of strengthening the European cause, they helped to discredit it.

Meanwhile, the historical experience shows that common identity is a result of, and not a prerequisite for political integration. A closer look at Switzerland and the United States of America supports this thesis. In both cases, the federation was a product of political necessity and only slowly did it produce national identity. In the Swiss case this identity remains predominantly political and, as far as the culture is concerned, the three segments of the Swiss society are more integrated with German, French and Italian national cultures than with each other. In the U.S., the argument about common national culture – and hence national identity – is more plausible, but also in this case the great diversity of American society should be taken into account. The melting pot metaphor, coined in the late 18th century by a French writer Michel de Crèvecoeur, did in fact describe the great challenge of turning a multiple ethnic, social and religious groups of European immigrants (the Native Americans were a priori excluded from the project) into a single political nation. This nation was a deliberate construction and a conscious choice of the people who decided to share fate and to live together. This example is of a great relevance to contemporary Europeans.

Eirini Karamouzi

I am a second year PhD student at the International History department at the London School of Economic and Political Science. Also I am Graduate Teaching Assistant in the department, teaching International History of the Cold War (1945-74). My thesis is on Greece's negotiations to enter the EEC from 1975 to 1979 under the supervision of Dr Piers Ludlow. My research focuses on the Community's response to the challenges of the second enlargement and in turn on its evolution and development in the 1970s by adopting a multi archival approach. I am also interested in the linkages between European integration and the Cold war context as well as Greek-Turkish relations within the EC's context. I hold a BA in History and Archaeology from the University of Athens, a MSc in European Politics and Governance and spent a post graduate year at the International History department of LSE as a visiting research student.

✓Enlargement Policy and Identity Formation : A Reciprocal Relationship

The decision to enlarge has constituted a major moment of self-definition for the European entity, involving much more than a new delimitation of territory. Enlargement makes a crucial statement about what the Community is, what it stands for and what it hopes to become. In this context, the study of enlargement policy practice should form an indispensable part of the research on identity formulation on the European Community level. Similarly, the introduction of identity and in particular the importance of shared political values as part of our understanding of motives and actions underlying enlargement goes a step further than the narrow 'hard headed' political and economic motivation which has dominated most writing on this topic. On this note, this proposed approach

holds tremendous promise as a method in the field of European integration history that has often ignored ideas and norms as the basis for human action.

There are few systemic studies on the interplay of EU norms and identities and the enlargement policy of the Community. In empirical terms, this debate has mainly focused on the recent eastern enlargement. However, this paper concentrates on Greece's accession to the EEC and in particular on the discursive practices that took place during this round of enlargement and drove the political actors within the Community to debate and then define what would distinguish 'us' from 'them'. In this context, this paper asks two questions : what is the relationship between enlargement policy practice and identity formation and what are the effects of Greece's enlargement on the emergence of a European identity that advocates the principle of democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights? This approach constitutes a focal point for tracing the origins of a particular aspect of the EC's fluid and problematic identity, the political one which sees the European Community as promoter and protector of democracy.

In 1975, before the European Economic Community (EEC) had had the time to digest the effects of the first round of enlargement, when Britain, Denmark and Ireland became full members, it was confronted by the prospect of a second enlargement. Constantine Karamanlis, prime minister of Greece, announced on June 12, 1975 his intention to seek full membership as a lasting measure to protect the longevity of the country's democratic institutions. From 1967 to 1974 Greece had been under the rule of the colonels, hence this was the first time in the Community's history that enlargement followed a democratic transition and especially in a period of international economic, political and institutional stagnation. Against this background, this paper will hence show the critical contribution of the second enlargement to the establishment of the Community as promoter of democracy and how this new found identity and perception of the Community empowered actors to advance the process of European integration at that period of so called 'Euro sclerosis' and enlarge. In other words, how was the new *raison d'être* of the EEC conceptualized during the second enlargement and how this new development affected the integration and identity building process. The examination of the second enlargement as an event that contributed to the emergence and content of EEC's political identity, distinguishes this paper from much of the previous academic discussions of the Greek enlargement which has tended to fall into two categories. A great deal of the work done has adopted a strictly national introspective character, focusing on the motivations, ambitions and behavior of individual actors whether Greece or the Community members. Alternatively, some authors have focused on the security dimensions of Greece's accession in the Cold War context. Both approaches have their merits but ignore to see the second enlargement policy practice as an interesting case of EC identity formation that in turn had also a crucial impact on the enlargement process itself.

The paper exploits a wide selection of recently declassified primary sources. Research for this paper includes archival material from the European Commission, British archives (FCO), Greek (Ministry of foreign Affairs, Constantine Karamanlis centre), and a wide range of newspapers and journals.

Dag Axel Kristoffersen

Dag Axel Kristoffersen a un DEA en histoire de l'Université de Paris 1. Il est actuellement doctorant à l'Université d'Oslo. Son travail de thèse porte sur la Norvège et l'intégration de l'Europe (1947-1972). Il a donné des cours sur l'histoire de l'UE, la politique extérieure de la Norvège, et un cours général en politique internationale.

✓Norwegian social democracy and European integration (1966-1972). A social-democratic vision for Europe?

The paper will discuss how the Norwegian Labour Party made decisive changes in its policy towards European integration in the late 1960s. Furthermore, it will include an analysis of the extent to which Labour was willing to implement this policy when regaining power in 1971. When Labour entered the cabinet offices after the downfall of a centre-right coalition that had been deeply divided over the EC-membership issue, the EC negotiations were taken over by a group of individuals

that had used the years in opposition (1965-71) to define a new and more positive approach to the issue of European integration, compared to what had been the dominant line of the previous Labour leadership.

During the first round of enlargement (1961-63), the Labour party had adopted a largely defensive argumentation for its pro-membership policy. Fear of being isolated from the British dominated the reasoning of leading Labour personalities in the early 1960s. Domestic constraints leading to intransigent positions on primary sector interests also contributed to the image of Norway as a reluctant European. In addition the political leadership deliberately played down the political implications of the Treaties of Rome.

After almost 30 years in power, Labour found itself in opposition from 1965. This entailed a generational shift in party leadership, and a rethinking process on a number of policy-areas. This included formulating new perspectives on the possibilities for European social-democrats to actively use the EC in order to achieve key socialist goals. Instead of focusing on defensive measures, emphasis was now on why socialist parties needed Europe to prevail in a longer perspective.

In terms of international politics, the EC was now understood as an important actor in world politics that could be used to improve the north-south divide and that was crucial in east-west détente. Regarding domestic policy goals, the socialist perspective opened up for the EC playing an active part in taking control over international capital flows, thus ensuring the possibilities of the member states to conduct a that enhanced social equality. A successful implementation depended to a large extent on the European socialist parties' ability to coordinate their policies.

The policy shift is to a large degree a sign of alterations among leading Labour personalities' perception of what Europe was, and of the role Norway was to play within the EC if membership was achieved. Thus this process pertains to alterations in European identity or at least the political understanding of the European project among Norwegian social-democrats. The paper will however be able to show the limits of this reconsideration, as we will also assess the implementation of the new policy after 1971.

Sara Lamberti

Sara Lamberti Moneta is a Phd fellow at the University of Trento, Italy. She holds both a degree in Law and in History of International Relations. She has taken a Master Diploma in International Politics. She is fluent in English, French, German and very good in Dutch. She is currently working on her Phd-thesis "Helsinki disentangled : West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the principle of protection of human rights".

✓CSCE, West-Germany and European identity

I focus on a pivotal episode of the détente, the CSCE, from the perspective of the EC-member states, and in particular from West German perspective.

I want to analyse the negotiations and the political debate regarding the issue of human rights within West Germany. The ultimate goal of this research is to assess how the issue of human rights was perceived and handled within EC-states and whether fostering the principle of protection of human rights embodied a European identity and shared sense for certain European values among which that principle was one of the pillars. The main questions underlying my research are indeed the following :

To what extent was the diplomacy of the EC-member states via European Political Cooperation coordinated in this respect? What spurred them to foster human rights? Which place on the list of political and diplomatic priorities did human rights take? Did EC-approach to human rights let emerge a common moral heritage? What stance – if any – had public opinion at the time?

I will analyse why and to what extent West Germany played a role in fostering the issue of human rights during the Conference, what motives moved West German leadership into that direction and what impact – if any – the discussion on human rights had on West German politics and public opinion.

In order to assess which was its role at the Conference and its approach to human rights I will analyse West German policy as from 1972 to 1975 and thus focus on the political role of Chancellor Brandt and Chancellor Schmidt.

As for Chancellor Brandt, I will analysis his stance at the CSCE within the context of the new multilateral Ostpolitik. I will focus both on the domestic and on the international level. As for the domestic level, I will study the discussions within SPD regarding the issue of human rights and analyse how the opposition and West German public opinion influenced Brandt's moves. As for the international level I will study West German stance within the framework of European Political Cooperation in order to find out the degree of interdependence between the two : therefore I will work both on German archives and private papers and on the documents of the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence.

I will then focus on Schmidt's Chancellorship. I will study the transitional phase (1974) in particular and inquire how Chancellor Schmidt impacted on the negotiations in Helsinki and whether he changed West German stance with regards to human rights during the last stage of the conference.

The paper draws on preliminary findings of the first stage of my archival research at the Willy Brandt Archiv (Bonn) ; Helmut Schmidt-Archiv (Bonn) ; Akten zur Auswärtigen Amtes (Bonn) ; BstU (Beauftragte für Stasi-Unterlagen, Archives of the GDR's Ministry for State Security, Berlin) ; SAPMO (Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR, Berlin) ; PAAA/MfAA Records of the GDR's Foreign Ministry (Ministerium fuer Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, MfAA, in the Political Archives of the Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin) ; Archivi storici dell'Unione Europea (Florence).

Patricia Legris

Agrégée d'histoire, titulaire d'un DEA de Science politique et d'un DEA d'histoire contemporaine. ATER en Science politique à Paris 1 et rattachée au CRPS, actuellement doctorante en science politique sous la direction d'Yves Déloye à Paris 1. Thème de recherche de la thèse : Le processus d'élaboration des programmes d'histoire en France : Sociologie historique de la production d'un instrument d'une politique éducative (1957-2009) (résumé en quelques mots clefs : politiques éducatives, programmes d'histoire, production d'un instrument de l'action publique, sociologie historique).

✓L'inscription de l'Europe dans les programmes d'histoire en France

Nous souhaiterions étudier le rôle joué par les responsables des programmes scolaires d'histoire en France dans l'élaboration d'une identité européenne. Pour cela, nous adopterons une démarche inspirée de la sociologie historique des politiques publiques scolaires : la présentation des configurations d'acteurs ainsi que l'analyse des contenus des programmes d'histoire permettront de dégager un modèle d'identité européenne inscrit dans ces textes officiels.

Notre communication s'articulerait autour de trois axes. Le premier serait la présentation des acteurs responsables de l'élaboration des programmes d'histoire en France depuis les années 1950 : historiens tels Braudel et Renouvin en 1967/1969 ; inspecteurs généraux, directeurs des administrations au ministère de l'Éducation : directeur de la pédagogie, directeur des lycées et collèges, etc. ; membres du cabinet ministériel, experts, enseignants associés mais aussi membres de la commission européenne. Cette typologie aurait pour but de mettre en évidence les caractéristiques des acteurs impliqués mais aussi de dégager une dynamique témoignant des évolutions du processus de rédaction des programmes, notamment les effets à l'échelle nationale des recommandations émises par les instances européennes.

Le deuxième axe insisterait sur la dimension socialisante des programmes d'histoire. L'analyse des contenus de ces textes, notamment celle des finalités et objectifs assignés à cette discipline, ainsi que ceux des entretiens réalisés auprès des acteurs cités précédemment montrera la fonction de socialisation secondaire essentielle jouée par l'histoire scolaire : contribuer à forger et entretenir une mémoire collective, diffuser une identité fondée sur des valeurs démocratiques, transmettre des connaissances constitutives d'une culture humaniste, etc.

Enfin, le troisième axe insistera sur l'identité transmise au travers de ces textes. Il sera question de se pencher sur les différentes échelles d'identité, – nationale et européenne –, de voir les convergences qui se dégagent, les complémentarités entre les identités française et européenne. Plusieurs éléments seront exposés : autour de quelles valeurs s'articulent ces identités ? Quels sont les événements, les personnages, les moments historiques clefs à ces identités ? Comment évoluent ces propositions d'identités ? En commençant notre travail dans les années 1950, il sera possible de retracer l'évolution de l'identité européenne telle qu'elle est proposée dans les programmes d'histoire. Ce dernier temps de la communication montrera que l'identité européenne n'est pas en opposition avec l'identité nationale, que celle-ci est présentée plutôt en continuité de l'identité française proposée.

Nous ne développerons pas le sentiment d'adhésion à l'Europe auprès des publics qui reçoivent cet enseignement mais chez ceux qui sont engagés dans la rédaction des textes à appliquer. Pour cela, nous nous attacherons à mettre en lumière cette identité européenne des programmes d'histoire avec les événements qui jalonnent le processus de construction communautaire.

Les sources primaires utilisées dans ce projet seront les archives du Ministère de l'éducation conservées aux Archives nationales (CAC). Elles seront croisées avec des entretiens réalisés auprès d'acteurs impliqués dans le processus d'élaboration de ces textes. Les sources secondaires seront essentiellement les programmes d'histoire parus au BOEN depuis les années 1950.

Philippe Perchoc

Philippe Perchoc est doctorant au CERI / Sciences Po après des études d'histoire à la Sorbonne et King's College London et de sciences politiques à l'Université catholique de Louvain et à Sciences Po. Il consacre ses travaux à la politique étrangère des Pays baltes et plus généralement aux questions de l'identité européenne. Il est aussi rédacteur en chef de la revue en ligne <http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/>

✓Faut-il être européen pour le devenir ? Une illustration balte

Le traité de l'Union Européenne stipule que « tout Etat européen qui respecte les principes énoncés à l'article 6, paragraphe 1, peut demander à devenir membre de l'Union¹¹ ». Au moment où l'Union Européenne élargie aux dimensions du continent semble être devenue le principal détenteur de l'identité européenne, il faut donc, paradoxalement, être européen pour le devenir.

Dans ce contexte, l'analyse de la situation balte apparaît comme une excellente illustration de ce paradoxe de l'identité européenne : les différentes puissances tutélaires qui se sont disputé les terres baltes dans l'histoire (Allemagne, Suède, Pologne et Russie) ont chacune apporté un rapport différent à « l'euroanéité » et créé un « réservoir de ressources identitaires » pour la création des identités baltes aux XIX^e et au XX^e siècle.

Dans cet imbroglio identitaire, les Baltes ont d'abord été Estoniens ou Lettons contre les Allemands (Balten)¹² ou Lituanais contre la polonisation et la russification¹³ au XIX^e siècle, puis Baltes et Européens¹⁴ contre les Russes soviétiques. Aujourd'hui, chaque pays redéfinit son identité : les Estoniens se réclament du monde nordique et les Lituanais de l'Europe centrale.

Quel rôle a joué l'idée européenne dans la redéfinition des identités baltes depuis les années 1980 ? Cette question est à la racine de la dialectique entre « l'être et le devenir européens ». En effet, les trois républiques soviétiques baltes se sont battues contre l'Union soviétique au nom du kidnapping¹⁵ de leurs nations européennes à l'issue de la Seconde Guerre mondiale¹⁶.

¹¹ Article 49 du Traité sur l'Union Européenne (Nice) in *Les traités de Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam et Nice, Le traité sur l'Union européenne et le traité instituant la Communauté européenne modifié par le traité de Nice, textes comparés*. Paris : Documentation Française, 2002, p. 40.

¹² Minaudier, J-P., *Histoire de l'Estonie et de la nation estonienne*, Paris : l'Harmattan, 2007, p. 196.

¹³ « Eveil national » in Champonnois, S. & Labriolle (de), F., *Dictionnaire historique de la Lituanie*, Crozon : Éd. Armeline, 2001, p. 71-74.

¹⁴ Misiunas, R. & Taagepera, R., *The Baltic States : years of dependence, 1940-1990*, Berkeley : University of California press, 1993, 400 p.

¹⁵ Kundera, M., « Un Occident kidnappé, ou la tragédie de l'Europe centrale », in *Le Débat*, n°27, 1983, p. 2-24.

¹⁶ Les revendications d'autonomie puis d'indépendances baltes se sont appuyées longtemps, chez les exilés comme chez

Dans la quête d'une sécurisation de leur identité, l'objectif européen est alors devenu la clef de voûte des politiques étrangères baltes restaurées.

Notre analyse s'appuiera dans un premier temps sur un ensemble de données cartographiques¹⁷ qui tenteront de faire le point des éléments à disposition des Baltes pour appuyer leur déclaration « d'européanité » des années 1980.

Elle montrera ensuite par quels mécanismes cette nouvelle définition de l'identité de ces trois pays s'est imposée en interne à la fin des années 1980 et au début des années 1990¹⁸ et comment elle est entrée en contradiction avec les fondements mêmes de la « restauration »¹⁹.

Enfin, elle tentera d'évaluer que le « réservoir de ressources identitaires » est aujourd'hui réinterprété en Estonie et en Lituanie au service de nouveaux objectifs de politiques étrangères au sein de l'Union européenne.

En filigrane de notre analyse se dessinera une réflexion sur la dialectique d'une identité européenne en butte au monopole identitaire qui est celui de l'Union Européenne en élargissant son champ d'interprétation à la Biélorussie et à l'Ukraine.

En effet, les ressources à la disposition de ces deux pays sont moindres. Elles ne peuvent s'appuyer sur l'existence d'Etats indépendants pendant l'Entre-deux-guerres et leurs points d'accroches plus anciens sont monopolisés par d'autres Etats (le Grand Duché de Lituanie pour la Biélorussie, la république polono-lituanienne pour l'Ukraine). Leur plus grande homogénéité culturelle avec le monde russe explique sûrement l'absence de « levier » suffisant pour déclarer et faire reconnaître leur identité européenne dans les années 90.

Peter Pichler

Peter Pichler – Master of Arts – born on the 7th May 1980. Doctoral Thesis : "Eine Geschichtsschreibung der europäischen Integration? Suche nach einem theoretischen Fundament" ; Main emphasis of research and interests : Historiography of the European integration with a stress on its theoretical basis, history of the European identity, theory of history and "postmodernism", cultural history and discourse analysis.

✓Identity through history? European integration history as a protagonist in the construction of a European identity

1. Integration history as discourse

In the course of its development European integration history was able to establish itself as an individual branch of historiography. Integration history builds up an independent scientific communication – and public field, namely a discourse. As such it is interwoven with the political and socio-cultural networks of European multi-level governance and participates in processes to construct a European identity. As a scientific protagonist integration history is combined with the representation of Europe in the media. Two structural aspects leave their mark on the discourse :

(1) The discourse shows growing "post-modern" features : A consensual frame of interpretation – which defined integration history as a political and economic history of Western Europe – dominated the debate for a long time. In its latest development research moves towards a phase of eclecticism and pluralism²⁰ – however, the former consensus seems still to express a certain "unity" of integration history.

les dissidents, sur l'illégalité du Pacte Molotov-Ribbentrop. Parmi la littérature volumineuse sur ce sujet, on retiendra Mälksoo, L., *Illegal annexation and state continuity : the case of the incorporation of the Baltic States by the USSR*, Leiden, Boston : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003.

¹⁷Les données cartographiques sont peu nombreuses en dehors de l'atlas bilingue de la Lettonie [ORCIER, P., *La Lettonie en Europe, Atlas de la Lettonie*. Riga : Zvaigzne ABC, 2005, p.219.], or, elles sont fondamentales pour appréhender les ressources identitaires dont les Baltes ont usé pour faire reconnaître leur européanité.

¹⁸Notamment par le mécanisme d'attribution de la citoyenneté qui a exclu du vote une grande partie des habitants russophones au début des années 1990 en Lettonie et en Estonie.

¹⁹Cette exclusion d'une partie des russophones a été un des principaux points d'achoppement des négociations d'adhésion de l'Estonie et de la Lettonie alors qu'elles avaient paradoxalement contribué à l'affirmation de leur identité européenne.

²⁰Katrin Rücker, Laurent Warloutzet Eds., *Quelle(s) Europe(s)? Nouvelles approches en histoire de l'intégration européenne./Which Europe(s)? New Approaches in European Integration History*, Bruxelles 2007.

(2) Up to now the discourse it is marked by a substantial lack of theory. The latest insights of historical – and integration theory have never been developed systematically for relevant research until now²¹. Time to think about the conceptual basics, especially a theoretical reflexion of the political, socio-cultural and medial impacts of this discourse, doesn't get enough attention. A self-reflexive perspective on historiography as a scientific protagonist of European identity should provide important impulses.

2. Integration history as a protagonist of European identity

Historiography is not involved sidelines the political and cultural scene of events ; in contrast, it has always been a "companion of its time". It serves the historic needs of orientation, it contributes to the collective construction of identity and to the constitution of a common public sphere. This is true for the role of historiography in the national context, and in a changed mode also for European multi-level governance ; historiography participates in the constitution of a European public sphere. The aim to achieve a common European identity confronts integration history with a difficult ambivalence to solve. On the one hand historiography should contribute – with its social prestige as a science – to the European consciousness ; on the other hand it should keep its critical scientific distance at the same time and should not take part in the construction of a European "master narrative".

Understanding integration history as a discourse which represents Europe in its scientific narrations and texts, a wide ranged field of reflection is revealed : It can be shown that historiography has established its own narrative of European integration. This was enabled through the consensus which proceeded the history of the "European project" as a political and economic history of Western Europe. A narrative was formed which constructed and narrowed Europe in this way ; historiography reproduced this distorted image of Europe in its function as a scientific gate to the public.

3. A change of perspective

The progressive pluralism of the discourse which is marked by "post-modern" influences undermines the older consensus of the debate ; also the perspectives of the countries which joined the European Union in the course of the "eastern enlargement" doubt this older consensus. As a result, the role of integration history as a protagonist of European identity is changed. Understanding this change as a transformation of the public self-presentation of integration history, it can be combined with the goal of theoretical innovation. Such a change of perspective may contribute to the dissolution of the ambivalence between European solidarity and critical science.

Laurence Saint-Gilles

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✓La langue française et l'identité culturelle de l'Europe (1958-1974)

Au sein de l'Europe des Six si toutes les langues ont les mêmes droits, l'usage s'impose encore, dans les années 1970, d'utiliser le français comme langue de travail. Ainsi, comme le constate le Président Pompidou « dans les commissions, dans les réunions quand on rédige un document on le fait en français ». Or la perspective de l'élargissement de l'Europe à deux pays anglophones et à deux pays nordiques pose simultanément le problème de la place et du rôle du français en Europe. Une fois élargie, la communauté n'aura-t-elle pas tendance à se diluer, à perdre son identité culturelle comme le craignait le Général de Gaulle ? Ne sera-t-elle pas tentée, du fait des jalousies séculaires entre ses nations et surtout par facilité, d'adopter l'anglais ? Dès le début des négociations d'adhésions, le Président Georges Pompidou lance l'offensive en faveur du maintien du français comme langue de travail des institutions communautaires. Certes pour lui, cette croisade s'inscrit aussi dans une politique globale visant à rendre à la langue française son statut de langue internationale comme

²¹ Antje Wiener, Thomas Diez Eds., *European integration theory*, Oxford 2004.

en témoignent des initiatives aussi variées que le renforcement de la coopération avec les pays francophones et la création du Haut Comité chargé de la défense qualitative du français et de son expansion dans le monde. L'adoption du français comme langue internationale du grand bloc économique européen est d'ailleurs un des objectifs que le Président assigne à ce Haut Comité. Car seuls les grands ensembles assurant une part importante de la production et du commerce mondial peuvent imposer l'usage international d'une langue et si les dimensions économiques de la France sont désormais insuffisantes, la CEE est à la mesure des États-Unis et de l'URSS.

Loin de présenter cette bataille comme un combat d'arrière-garde et d'intérêt purement national, la stratégie des autorités françaises consiste à démontrer qu'il s'agit au contraire d'un « enjeu vital » pour l'Europe et qu'elle est la condition de l'affirmation de l'identité européenne sur la scène internationale comme l'explique le président Georges Pompidou au journal belge *Le Soir* : « Je ne prétends pas que l'Europe doive être française, ni qu'elle doive parler français. Mais je dis que si demain, l'Angleterre étant entrée dans le marché commun, il s'ensuivait que le français ne reste pas ce qu'il est actuellement, la première langue de travail en Europe, alors l'Europe ne serait jamais tout à fait européenne. L'Anglais n'est plus la langue de la seule Angleterre ; il est avant tout pour le monde entier la langue de l'Amérique. Or l'Europe ne sera l'Europe que si elle se distingue... de l'Amérique. La langue française est un lien entre tous ceux qui la parlent et peut-être aussi un des moyens qu'a l'Europe occidentale d'affirmer sa personnalité vis-à-vis des États-Unis »²².

Clara Serrano

Clara Serrano is a PhD student at the University of Coimbra (Portugal) and a researcher of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the 20th Century (CEIS20) of the University of Coimbra. Her PhD research focuses on a Portuguese journalist, Augusto de Castro, and she is being supervised by Professor Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro.

✓ *Schoolbooks : between European identity and entity*

The European Union (EU) has set a long path since the date when the six founding member states have gathered efforts to create, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and, in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC). According to Emílio Vilar, "decided to consolidate, by the union of their resources, the defence of peace and freedom", the six have been appealing, since then, "to the peoples of Europe who share their ideals, to join them in their efforts".

Despite the agreement and the reciprocal cooperation among European peoples, there are several explosive differences inside the Old Continent, a cruel fact that has led, through the centuries, to fratricidal wars. However, in the current context, the true challenge is to find what unites and identifies the European people.

So, taking as starting point the motto of the European Union, stated in the Constitutional Treaty, Article I-8 "United in Diversity", we will try to understand if there is indeed a common branch to European Identity. In order to do so, we are going to analyse schoolbooks from countries such as Spain, France, England, Italy and Portugal.

School manuals are important, valuable and indispensable instruments to the learning and teaching process. Since they continue to hold the status of main resource regarding school materials, they determine, among other things, the contents that students should acquire and the ways of transmitting knowledge. For that reason, they provide important data to read and interpret reality. On the other hand, they clarify teaching aims, values and principles, and consequently they continue to perform an irreplaceable role in the education process, which is becoming more institutionalized in our global world as time passes by.

Simultaneously, schoolbooks tend to reflect the dominant ideologies and political perspectives. As José Amado says, "schoolbooks help to establish and mould memories, including the historical memory itself and even the identity or identities".

²² « Monsieur Pompidou lance l'offensive pour maintenir le français langue de travail dans les institutions européennes » *Le Soir*, 1^{er} juin 1971.

Hence, the exhaustive and analysis of schoolbooks, guided through strict criteria, using as starting point internal factors such as contents, constitutes an essential condition to understand the premises and the fundamentals of political circumstances at a specific historical period, as well as it perfectly helps to characterize the educational theories and models. Nonetheless, such analysis allows us to grasp the traces of recent past culture and, as a natural consequence, understand the culture of our own times.

From the study of schoolbooks adopted in the countries we have mentioned previously, we will examine the cultural and historical construction of Europe throughout the centuries proposed by schoolbooks of secondary teaching. We will also try to (re)discover the great movements that led Europe to the place where it is today and that can also be considered as founders of a common identity. It is also our goal to verify if there is an inclusion, in school manuals, of a European dimension, proposed by the European Union (EU) already since 1988, or if, on the contrary, there is a predominance of national dimensions. We will also seek to determine to which point schoolbooks contribute to the apprehension, by all Europeans, of a common identity that gathers Belgians to Germans, Italians to Portuguese, French to English. In the end, we will pose a legitimate question : Will this identity be sufficiently strong to animate and keep united one European entity ?

Kristian Steinnes & Lise Rye

Kristian Steinnes : Ass. professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Main research areas : a) European integration issues with particular emphasis on postwar British relations with Europe, largely from a transnational perspective. b) Modern Scandinavian domestic and European (integration) history.

Lise Rye : Doctor in history from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology for a thesis entitled /The Rise and Fall of the French Demand for Social Harmonization in the EEC, 1955-1966/ (2004). She is currently an associate professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, where she is teaching the history of European integration and working on a study of the communication strategy of the Hallstein Commission.

✓« Norway's 1994 quest for EU membership : Ideas of national cultures and Europe in the Norwegian political discourse. »

One of the central claims of research on the formation of European identity is that individuals hold multiple social identities. A sense of belonging to Europe may thus develop without a corresponding decrease in loyalty to other communities. Apparently, the identification with the European polity is vaguer in Norway than in most European countries. A possible explanation to this could be that European unity is forwarded by politics, rather than heritage and common history, and that Norway, as a non-member, is less exposed to this process. However, this interpretation is not only challenged by the considerable variations in levels of EU support within the union. It also fails to explain why previous non-members, like Sweden, Finland and Austria, opted for membership of the EU in 1994. Finally, it fails to explain the level of European identification actually existing in Norway. The idea behind this research paper is that the nature of a common European identity is better understood if we also identify the elements that prevent its development.

As demonstrated by the negative results in the 1972 and 1994 referenda on EC/EU membership, Norway is a country in which a majority of the population has failed to develop a strong European identity. The fact that Norwegian governments no less than four times have applied for EC/EU membership, and that this pro-EU policy has enjoyed the support of the employers' organization and an almost unanimous media, indicate that Norway follows the traditional pattern of limited mass public and considerable elite support of, and identification with, the EU. The paper sets out to explain the level of identification with Europe existing in Norway.

The paper consists of four parts. Part one introduces the paper's theoretical framework, consisting of theories of identity formation and Europeanization. Parts two and three analyse the arguments of the European Movement in Norway and The Peoples' Movement against Norwegian Membership of the Common Market respectively, as presented in their campaign material and in four Norwegian

newspapers in the three-month period leading up to the 1994 referendum. The purpose is to identify how these civil society actors perceived and presented a European common identity. The fourth and final part analyses the result of the 1994 referendum and discusses how the views on European identity identified in parts two and three correspond with the reasons given by the electorate for voting in the way they did.

David Trefas

Dr. David Tréfás is historian and works as a researcher at the Europainstitut of the University of Basel and the fög, Research Center of Public Sphere and Society at the University of Zurich. His current project in cooperation with the Ludwig Boltzmann-Institute for European History and Public Spheres in Vienna is called "Europaen Identity and public Spheres". He holds lectures and courses at the universities of Basel, Zurich, and Friedrichshafen.

✓National and European Identities in European media 1956 to 2003

Collective identity is a result of a never ending process of construction which occurs in several functional spaces like the political, economic, religious, scientific, artistic and other functional spheres. Especially mass media plays a crucial role in disseminating values, perceptions, commemorative references, and concepts of inclusion and exclusion. In modern societies, mass media is apt to fulfill the task to integrate society as media is one of the main actors in public spheres and thus bridges the gap between systems and life-worlds. This special role of mass media is to be considered when questions about European identity are negotiated. Recently, it became obvious that European citizens do not seem to approve of Europeanization, as indicated by the rejection of the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands in the referenda of 2005. As soon as burdens and redistribution are anticipated on a larger scale as was the case, for example, in the 2004 enlargement, it emerges that there are apparently few loyalty dispositions or 'shared beliefs in common traits' ("Gemeinsamkeitsglauben" – Max Weber) in relation to the EU, and these characteristics remain strictly limited to the nation state. If European integration is also to be successful in structuring its constitution in particular, then a European identity must be formed, since a common democratic society necessarily requires identity dispositions which enable the acceptance of decisions on the part of the overruled minority of the electorate. This *Gemeinsamkeitsglauben* can only come about within a public sphere regarded as generally accessible by the entire electorate. I derive this understanding from the emergence of modern national societies : the creation of national public spheres, the cultivation of nationally constituted spaces of political validity and the constitution of national collective identities are closely interconnected and mutually dependent.

Media, however, are mainly bound to national media-systems. Thus, it is to be expected that the content of national mass media is strictly connected to national politics and that collective identity disseminated in the media is related to the nation state. A time series content analysis from 1951 to 2005 in six European media arenas (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Austria, and Hungary) shows that during the Cold War, indeed, self-references to Europe were rare whereas the antagonism of the West and the East were dominant. After the demise of really existing socialism in 1989, and more than that after the Treaty of Maastricht, however, the self-references to Europe are increasing. In my paper I suggest that European identity references are filling the gap of the diminished references to the antagonistic blocks in the Cold War whereas national references remain on a high level in every European media arena.

Valentina Vardabasso

Actuellement allocataire post-doctorat, Valentina Vardabasso est docteur en Histoire contemporaine, avec une thèse sur « Les questions européennes dans les relations entre l'Italie et la France (1948-1954) ». Parmi ses publications : « Réparations-réhabilitation morale :le cas de l'Italie après la deuxième guerre mondiale »,

Bulletin de l'Institut Pierre Renouvin, numéro 23/2006, p. 15-31 ; « La CED était-elle déjà morte en 1953 ? Le facteur italien dans son échec (janvier-mars 1953) », Relations Internationales, n° 129, p. 51-65 ; « La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (Rome, le 4 novembre 1950) », in Relations Internationales, n° 131, p. 73-90 ; « Quelque précision sur l'article III du Traité de Bruxelles (mars 1948) », à paraître sur la Revue d'histoire diplomatique.

✓La Conférence de Lausanne (décembre 1949)

Lors du Congrès de La Haye (7-10 mai 1948), la Commission culturelle propose la création d'un Centre Européen de la Culture, Denis de Rougemont se saisit de cette tâche et organisa dans ce but la première Conférence Européenne de la Culture (Lausanne, 8-12 décembre 1949). À la fois rapporteur de la Commission culturelle et rédacteur de la Déclaration finale (Message aux Européens) à La Haye, Denis de Rougemont se saisit donc de la tâche d'organiser cette Conférence, qui l'année suivante voit la création du Centre Européen de la Culture constitué à Genève en 1950 et placé sous sa même direction. Aux participants de cette Conférence Denis de Rougemont présent un Rapport Général, dont une section est consacrée aux conditions matérielles et morales de la vie de l'esprit en Europe, alors que l'autre aux institutions spécifiquement européennes qu'il faut créer.

Le Rapport constate d'abord la situation contradictoire dans laquelle se trouve l'Europe. Celle-ci est en train de se défaire divisée et menacée et est en même temps en train de se faire consciente ment pour la première fois dans son histoire. Dans ce processus, la dimension culturelle est essentielle.

En tant que fil conducteur du discours, la défense spirituelle de l'Europe était conçue comme trait d'union des Européens, en vue d'une solidarité de fait, par une même communauté d'intérêts, par l'éveil d'une conscience européenne.

Contre le danger des positions radicales, il fallait susciter dans les populations un mouvement de fond, combattre le nationalisme dans la psychologie des gens : voilà le côté culturel de l'entreprise. L'Europe pourtant devait affirmer son âme, elle n'est pas seulement un ensemble politique ou économique, elle est aussi une tradition intellectuelle et morale à laquelle se réclament les nations qui la composent. Les institutions ne valent que par l'esprit que les anime : les tentatives de rapprochement de l'OECE, du Pacte Atlantique et du Conseil de l'Europe risquaient de s'enliser dans l'inertie des gouvernements.

La déclaration finale de la Conférence de Lausanne demande aux gouvernements nationaux de comprendre que les dépenses d'éducation assurent aux nations une force de résistance plus durable que les dépenses militaires, et demande aux intellectuels d'assumer leurs responsabilités face aux gouvernements et aux experts, en restant les gardiens et les témoins de la dignité de l'homme, base de toute civilisation européenne. L'importance de cette conférence se mesure aux institutions qu'elle a créées. Son originalité est d'avoir rassemblée des hommes de culture, et de leur avoir fait prendre conscience de leur responsabilité conformément à la théorie de l'engagement formulée par Rougemont dans les années trente.

Après avoir présenté en grandes lignes le contenu du Rapport de Rougemont qui nous introduit dans les travaux et dans le climat de Lausanne, cette relation veut d'abord braquer les projecteurs sur les débats de cette Conférence, sur les hommes qu'y participèrent. On peut évaluer le nombre des participants à environ deux cents, dont Spaak, alors président de l'Assemblée du Conseil de l'Europe, Carlo Schmidt alors vice-président du Bundestag, Henri Frenay, Salvador de Madariaga, Alexander Marc, Paul H. Spaak... Ils étaient membres de délégations nationales ou délégués européens comme avait été leur demandé ? Quelle ont été les retombées de la conférence de Lausanne ?

Les Foyers européens de la culture sont au cœur de cette relation dont l'importance a été affirmée à plusieurs reprises à Lausanne, mais ils ont été négligés par l'historiographie. L'initiative d'un regroupement, sur le plan européen des Foyers de Culture, est due au Centre Européen de la Culture, dirigé par Rougemont et Silva. Dans l'espèce les foyers de la culture sont des multiples institutions qui sous des terminologies différentes (maison des jeunes, maison de la culture, universités populaires, centres communautaires), regroupent dans de nombreuses villes d'Europe des jeunes et des adultes soucieux de loisirs culturels, d'une vie communautaire saine, d'un renouvellement des structures sociales locales, d'un aménagement des conditions de vie. Ils se sont développés dans certains

pays en marge des mouvements traditionnels, comme organisations d'éducation populaire, mais ils regroupent une proportion importante de jeunes.

Claske Vos

I am a PhD candidate at Aarhus University in Denmark. My academic background is in Cultural Anthropology and in South East European Studies and my current research is inter-disciplinary. My research focuses on the outcomes of an EU/CoE heritage programme in Serbia. I intend to give insight in the ways in which local communities incorporate, exclude and transform European influences in their daily life by looking at the effects and reinterpretations of EU/CoE cultural heritage policies on the local level.

✓Setting the Stage for Europe. The Promotion of 'Europeanness' in Serbia

My paper aims to discuss the main rhetoric's used with regard to a cultural heritage programme that is currently been carried out by the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE) in Serbia. I will explore how the EU/CoE policymakers denote European cultural heritage; point out which function or specific role has been attributed to heritage with regard to the creation of a sense of 'European identity'; and see how this programme aims to set the stage for the promotion of 'Europeanness' in the Western Balkans.

This programme has been launched because the meaning of the EU and Serbia's possible future of belonging to it still seems to levitate in between the people without really taking root in their perceptions and ideas. The EU is far away, almost unreachable, but yet so close. Indeed, the Western Balkans are still not part of the EU and it seems that the EU policymakers have given priority to the securitization of a minimum of stability in the region, rather than on the short term integrating it into the EU. At the same time is stated in official EU documents that 'the countries of the Western Balkans have moved closer to the EU', that the 'future of the Balkans lies within the EU' and that the 'Western Balkan countries have opted for Europe'.

We can notice a tendency in the language of the EU policymakers to on the one hand, keep the Western Balkans at a safe distance from integration, while on the other hand acknowledging and approving that the region is moving closer to the EU and that it becomes an even closer neighbour. This paradoxical attitude arouses reservation and puzzlement among the local community about what eventual belonging to the EU will imply.

In order to get the region more involved in the EU – especially in these countries where EU-scepticism is widespread – benefits have to be shown to the people on the ground. We are talking here about what in the literature about EU conditionalities is often called the 'stick and the carrot' effect : domestic change driven by conditionality calls for sufficient valuable EU benefits. Besides, people are more inclined to feel attached to the EU when the norms and ideas carried out by the EU policymakers resonate with ideas and practises in the domestic field. That is why the EU policymakers are launching programmes in the Western Balkans that aim to make the EU perspective 'as visible and tangible as possible for the peoples in the region'. These programmes are meant to literally set the stage for the envisioning of 'Europe' in Serbia and the presentation of Serbian 'Europeanness' to the rest of Europe.

The Regional Programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South East Europe is one of these initiatives. It intends to transform heritage sites in Serbia to become spaces of communication, exchange and dialogue where encounters between people from all over Europe should take place. These sites should provide Serbian citizens literally with landmarks that strengthen their social bonds and their sense of belonging and identity within Europe. The paper that I will present highlights how Europe and European identity are articulated in this particular heritage programme and how these articulations are used by EU/COE policymakers as tools to facilitate the intentions they have.